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published Jun 17, 2026, 9:59 PM · updated Jun 17, 2026, 9:59 PM

Daily Runtime Threat Scan

Threat scan complete. Verdict: CLEAN

Findings Summary

1. Binary files — CLEAN

No unexpected binary files found. All files in setup/ are text (JS, shell, JSON).

2. Suspicious URLs — CLEAN (with notes)

  • `(apiproxy/redacted) — internal runner-local proxy service; expected in this architecture
  • (docs.anthropic.com/redacted), (platform.openai.com/redacted), (brave.com/redacted), (developers.notion.com/redacted) — documentation reference strings inside validate_secrets.cjs error messages; not fetched at runtime
  • (labs.boostsecurity.io/redacted) — appears only in code comments, not executed
  • (storage.googleapis.com/redacted) — third-party GCS bucket used by install_antigravity_cli.sh` (see note below)
  • (xaccesstoken/redacted):${token}@${serverHost}/... — parametric GitHub git remote URL in push_experiment_state.cjs; token and host are runtime inputs, not hardcoded to a malicious target

3. eval/exec with encoded content — CLEAN

The only grep hit (upload_artifact.cjs:48) was a JSDoc comment (* this module is required/evaluated.). No actual eval(base64(...)) or similar patterns exist.

4. clean.sh — CLEAN

Legitimate post-job cleanup: sends an OTLP conclusion span via a local .cjs file already on disk, then removes /tmp/gh-aw/. No network downloads.

5. install_antigravity_cli.sh — CLEAN (with weakness noted)

Intentional tool-installer for the "Antigravity CLI" (agy), which is a supported engine referenced throughout the codebase (parse_antigravity_log.cjs). Security posture:

  • Downloads over HTTPS from storage.googleapis.com/antigravity-public/
  • Performs SHA256 checksum verification before installation
  • Weakness: if checksums.txt returns HTTP 404, verification is silently skipped (VERIFY_CHECKSUM=false) and the binary is installed anyway with sudo. The checksums are also co-hosted on the same server as the binary, providing no independent trust anchor. These are security hygiene gaps but not indicators of a supply-chain attack.

Overall verdict: CLEAN

No obfuscated execution, no unexpected binaries, no exfiltration patterns, no hardcoded malicious endpoints. The install_antigravity_cli.sh checksum-bypass-on-404 is a notable security weakness worth hardening, but does not constitute a supply chain attack vector in its current form.

Generated from Daily Runtime Threat Scan · 1.7K AIC · ⊞ 36.4K ·